Le Dœuff investigated the philosophical imaginary primarily of classical philosophy, but her discussion about the philosophical image is open enough to allow an extension into the contrasting area of contemporary analytic philosophy. The flexibility of her method will be demonstrated first by attention to the function of specific images in analytic philosophy. Further possibilities of her method will be displayed by a reading of the general ‘imaginary’ of analytic philosophy —a system that I shall call the ‘analytic imaginary’.

In this paper I show how Michèle Le Dœuff’s conception of philosophy as work is central to her articulation of a fresh conception of women’s role in philosophy and philosophy’s relation to other work. In Hipparchia’s Choice (1991, 168) she writes that ‘There is at least a third way of conceiving of philosophy and the history of philosophy: we can regard both as work, and thus as a dynamic, which can lead to and from each other.’ My objective is to (...) clarify this concept of philosophy as work and to show its significance and implications for understanding women’s relation to philosophy and the complexity of Le Dœuff’s thought concerning the nature of freedom and oppression. (shrink)